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Abstract: Overall labour productivity in India was already only around 15 per cent of 
the UK level between the early 1870s and the late 1920s. Between 1929 and 1950 
India fell further behind and remained at around 10 per cent of the UK level until the 
1970s. India has been catching-up since the 1970s, but by the end of the twentieth 
century was still further behind than in the late nineteenth century. Agriculture has 
played an important role in India’s relative decline to 1950 and subsequent delay in 
catching up, since comparative India/UK labour productivity in this sector has 
declined continuously and agriculture still accounts for around two-thirds of 
employment in India. Comparative India/UK labour productivity in industry has 
fluctuated around a level of around 15 per cent. The only sector to exhibit trend 
improvement in comparative India/UK labour productivity over the long run is 
services, rising from around 15 per cent to around 30%. India’s recent emergence as a 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There are a number of existing studies of comparative productivity and income over 
the period since the late nineteenth century for members of today’s rich-country 
convergence club (Pilat, 1993; Broadberry, 1998; Broadberry and Irwin, 2007). 
However, to identify the forces making for economic success, it is also important to 
examine the experience of countries which have remained less developed and 
compare them with the experience of the rich world. This paper considers the 
experience of India since 1870 in comparison with the United Kingdom. An Anglo-
Indian comparison is feasible because much statistical information was collected in 
India during the period of British rule before 1947, in a form which is relatively easy 
to compare with Britain. The comparison is also made possible by the impressive 
reconstruction of the Indian historical national accounts by Sivasubramonian (2000). 
The Anglo-Indian comparison is also of particular interest because of the recent 
emergence of India as a fast-growing tiger economy based on services rather than 
industry, in striking contrast to the case of China (Bosworth and Collins, 2007). 
 
  The comparative labour productivity performance can be summarised as 
follows. Around 1870, output per worker in India was about 15 per cent of the UK 
level in the economy as a whole, and fluctuated around this level until the end of the 
1920s.Between 1929 and 1950, Indian labour productivity fell below 10 per cent of 
the UK level, where it remained until the 1970s. Since the 1970s, India has begun to 
catch up on the United Kingdom, but by the end of the twentieth century was still 
further behind than in the early 1870s. Looking at the sectoral aspects of this relative 
decline, it is clear that agriculture lies at the heart of India’s productivity problem. 
Whereas in 1870 Indian labour productivity in agriculture was at more than 10 per   4
cent of the UK level, by 1999/2000 this had fallen to around 1 per cent. In industry, 
Indian labour productivity has been stationary, returning to around 15 per cent of the 
British level, although there have also been substantial periods of deviation from this 
long run level. In services, there has been a trend improvement from around 15 per 
cent of the UK level in the late nineteenth century to around 30 per cent by the late 
twentieth century. Since agriculture accounted for around three-quarters of the Indian 
labour force between the 1870s and the 1970s, and still 65 per cent at the end of the 
twentieth century, it is clear that India needs to drastically increase agricultural labour 
productivity if it is to improve its overall productivity performance. The sectoral 
results also suggest that India’s recent experience of service-led growth has long 
historical roots (Bosworth and Collins, 2007). 
 
  The paper proceeds as follows. Section II sets out the basic data sources and 
methods, analysing the time series evidence on growth rates in the two countries and 
showing how to combine this with the cross-sectional evidence on comparative levels 
of income and productivity calculated at purchasing power parity. The results of the 
sectoral productivity comparison and the differences in the sectoral distribution of the 
labour force are then presented in section III. This is then followed in section IV by an 
analysis of differences in the share of the population in the labour force and the 
implications for comparative levels of per capita income. Section V then considers 
ways of cross-checking the results, while section VI concludes. 
 
II. DATA AND METHODS FOR ANGLO-INDIAN PRODUCTIVITY 
COMPARISONS 
1. Indian time series   5
The starting point for our comparative study is the time series data for India and the 
United Kingdom. For India, we rely largely on the historical national accounts 
reconstructed by Sivasubramonian (2000) for the twentieth century and Heston (1983) 
for the late nineteenth century. The data are generally presented on a fiscal year basis, 
running from 1 April to 31 March, and refer to the boundaries of British India until 
1946/47 and modern India thereafter. Table 1 presents the output and employment 
data for the whole economy and for the three main sectors, agriculture, industry and 
services. It should be noted that agriculture includes livestock farming, forestry and 
fishing as well as arable farming, while industry includes mining, construction and the 
utilities as well as manufacturing. Services comprises railways and communications, 
government services, other commerce and transport, professions and liberal arts, 
domestic service and house property. Full details of data sources are given in 
Appendix 1. 
 
  The output and employment data from Table 1 can be used to calculate indices 
of labour productivity by major sector in Table 2. From these indices it is possible to 
calculate the average annual growth rates of labour productivity by sector. During the 
late nineteenth century, labour productivity growth was fastest in industry and slowest 
in services. During the first half of the twentieth century, although there was 
respectable labour productivity growth in industry and services, labour productivity 
growth in the economy as a whole was held back by stagnation in agriculture. During 
the second half of the twentieth century, respectable labour productivity growth in 
industry and services has again been offset by slow productivity growth in agriculture. 
 
2. UK time series   6
The UK time series are taken largely from the historical national accounts of Feinstein 
(1972), updated with output estimates from the UK National Accounts and 
employment data from O’Mahony (2002). Again, full details of data sources are given 
in Appendix 1. The territory covered refers to the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and the whole of Ireland before 1920, but Great Britain and Northern Ireland after 
1920. In contrast to Broadberry (1998), where the output and employment data were 
both spliced at 1920, following the procedures of Maddison (1995) to provide 
continuous series within the current boundaries of the United Kingdom, in this study 
both the output and employment series change with the secession of southern Ireland, 
as in Maddison (2003). This does not make a lot of difference to the UK data, but is 
more in line with the procedures of Sivasubramonian (2000) for dealing with the 
major boundary change at the time of Indian independence. The output and 
employment series are presented on a sectoral basis in Table 3, from which it is 
possible to derive the indices of labour productivity and the labour productivity 
growth rates shown in Table 4.  
 
  UK labour productivity growth before World War I was fairly evenly spread 
across the major sectors, but slightly faster in industry than in services or agriculture. 
The period 1920-1950 saw an increase in the labour productivity growth rate in 
industry and agriculture, but stagnation in services. The period after World War II 
saw a further acceleration in the labour productivity growth rate, particularly in 
agriculture and industry. 
 
  Although the periodisation is slightly different in Tables 2 and 4, due to the 
different dates of major boundary changes, there are already a number of indications   7
of some of the major factors behind the differential productivity growth performance 
of India and the United Kingdom. First, note that overall labour productivity grew 
faster in Britain than in India before 1950, at about the same rate in the two countries 
between 1950 and 1970, and faster in India since 1970. We should thus expect to see 
India falling further behind Britain until around 1950 and beginning to catch up after 
1970. Second, the largest growth rate differentials were in agriculture, so that we can 
expect to see this sector making a large contribution to Indian falling behind. Third, 
during the period of Indian catching up since 1970, although labour productivity 
growth has been faster in industry than in services in both India and Britain, it is only 
in services that labour productivity growth has been higher in India than in Britain. 
This is in line with the focus of Bosworth and Collins (2007) on the key role of 
services in Indian growth. 
 
3. A benchmark for 1950 
The labour productivity data for India and the United Kingdom from Tables 2 and 4 
can be combined to provide trends in comparative labour productivity for each sector 
in index number form. To pin down the comparative labour productivity level, we 
provide a benchmark estimate for circa 1950, using data on nominal value added per 
employee in each country, compared at sector-specific price ratios, adjusted for 
purchasing power parity (PPP). This is necessary because the exchange rate cannot be 
assumed to be a perfect guide to differences in prices between two countries, 
especially at the level of individual goods and services, or particular sectors. For 
example, a country with a comparative advantage in agriculture may expect to have 
relatively cheap food, while a country with a comparative advantage in manufacturing 
may expect to have relatively cheap industrial goods, although we may expect the   8
effects of trade to moderate such tendencies. In the case of comparisons between 
developed and less developed countries, moreover, Balassa (1964) and Samuelson 
(1964) have highlighted the tendency of less developed economies to have a lower 
overall price level, due to the presence of non-traded goods and services. 
 
  Table 5 provides an India/UK PPP for agriculture circa 1950, using wholesale 
price data. Whilst it may be argued from a theoretical point of view that it would be 
better to have farm gate prices, this approach runs into the serious problem that the 
major Indian food crop is not grown in Britain. Given the importance of rice to the 
Indian economy, it seems more satisfactory to use wholesale prices to capture the 
availability of cheap food in the Indian economy. This is indeed reflected in the fact 
that at Indian production weights the PPP for agriculture is £1 = Rs 10.80, well below 
the exchange rate of £1 = Rs 13.36. Using UK production weights, however, gives a 
much higher weight to livestock products such as meat, which were relatively 
expensive in India, yielding a PPP for agriculture using UK weights of £1 = Rs 16.43. 
The geometric mean of the PPPs for agriculture at Indian and UK weights is £1 = Rs 
13.32, which is close to the exchange rate. 
 
  Table 6 provides a PPP for industry circa 1950 using factory gate prices from 
production censuses for India and the United Kingdom. Weights reflect shares in 
value added for major industrial categories such as chemicals, metals, etc. while 
within these categories individual products are weighted in line with shares of gross 
output. The industrial PPP of £1 = Rs 11.43 is the geometric mean of Rs 10.52 at 
Indian weights and Rs 12.43 at UK weights, indicating a lower industrial price level 
in India. However, this result depends heavily on the large textiles and clothing sector   9
where Indian prices were low, with Indian prices of many other industrial products, 
particularly chemicals, being higher than in Britain. 
 
  For services, we have followed Broadberry and Irwin (2007) in using a 
weighted average of the PPPs for agriculture and industry, taking the geometric mean 
of Indian and UK weights. This yields a PPP of £1 = Rs 12.25 for services and also 
for the economy as a whole. Although this indicates a lower price level in India than 
in Britain, the scale of the deviation from purchasing power parity is relatively small 
compared with the differences in more recent times. This apparent absence of a large 
Balassa-Samuelson effect in 1950 is consistent with the empirical findings of Bergin, 
Glick and Taylor (2006), who show the emergence of a significant Balassa-
Samuelson effect amongst a large sample of countries only after the 1950s. 
 
These PPPs can be used in Table 7 to provide a benchmark level of 
comparative labour productivity by sector circa 1950, which can be contrasted with 
the levels obtained using the market exchange rate. Using the sector-specific PPPs 
raises the Indian labour productivity level significantly in industry, services and the 
economy as a whole. For the economy as a whole circa 1950, Indian output per 
worker was less than 10 per cent of the UK level. 
 
III. SECTORAL ASPECTS OF PRODUCTIVITY PERFORMANCE 
1. Comparative labour productivity levels by sector 
Table 8 provides a breakdown of comparative labour productivity levels by the three 
main sectors of agriculture, industry and services. It is clear that India’s falling further 
behind during the period 1871-73 to 1950-51 and the slowness of India’s subsequent   10
catching-up has a lot to do with the performance of agriculture. In the early 1870s, an 
average Indian agricultural worker produced a bit more than 10 per cent of the output 
produced by an average British agricultural worker. By the 1950s, this had fallen to 
around 5 per cent, and by the 1990s to as little as 1 per cent. In industry, comparative 
labour productivity fluctuated but remained stationary, with Indian labour 
productivity returning to around 15 per cent of the British level. In services, the 
India/UK comparative labour productivity level trended upwards from around 15 per 
cent to around 30 per cent, although the disruption surrounding independence 
interrupted this upward trajectory, providing a setback to services as well as to 
agriculture and industry. 
 
2. The structure of economic activity 
To fully understand the contributions of the three main sectors to comparative 
productivity performance, it is necessary to track their shares in economic activity as 
well as their comparative productivity levels. Table 9 shows the percentage 
distribution of employment by major sectors for selected years. The sectoral 
composition of economic activity was clearly very different in the two countries. 
Compared even with other developed economies, Britain devoted a very small share 
of the labour force to agriculture, already by the late nineteenth century. Thus, for 
example, while both Germany and the United States still had around 50 per cent of 
their labour forces tied up in agriculture circa 1870, the United Kingdom had just 22.2 
per cent (Broadberry, 1998: 385). For India, the agricultural share of the labour force 
was around 75 per cent for the century after 1870, and even by the end of the 
twentieth century agriculture still accounted for nearly 65 per cent of Indian 
employment. Given this commitment of resources to an inherently low value added   11
sector, and the poor productivity performance within that sector, it is not difficult to 
understand India’s disappointing overall productivity performance during this period. 
 
  The other striking development in Table 9 is the growing share of employment 
accounted for by services in India, as well as in Britain. During the period of British 
rul in India, this was accompanied by a declining share of industry, but as agriculture 
began to shrink in importance, it became possible for both industry and agriculture to 
expand their shares of employment, particularly after 1970. Again the importance of 
services in Indian productivity performance highlighted by Bosworth and Collins 
(2007) for the current period appears to have its roots in earlier experience. 
 
IV. PER CAPITA INCOMES AND LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
Table 10 shows trends in comparative India/UK per capita incomes and labour 
productivity for the economy as a whole for the period 1871-73 to 1999-2000. The 
trends in the two series are quite similar, but the long term decline in India’s relative 
position is greater for per capita income than for labour productivity. This can be 
explained by different trends in the share of the population in the labour force in the 
two countries, shown in Table 11. Whereas in the early 1870s India had a slightly 
larger share of the population working than the United Kingdom, by the 1990s India’s 
share was substantially lower than the UK’s. This can be explained by the growing 
share of young people in the Indian population and by the growing proportion of 
women not entering the labour force in India. 
 
V. CROSS-CHECKING THE RESULTS   12
A number of recent studies have questioned the use of time series projections from a 
single benchmark over long periods of time, the methodology used here in Tables 8 
and 10. Ward and Devereux (2003) suggest that the further one projects from the 
original benchmark, the bigger the discrepancy between time series projections using 
GDP per head in constant prices and cross-sectional benchmarks based on nominal 
GDP per head converted at PPPs, because of index number problems. The issue is the 
subject of debate in Broadberry (2003) and Ward and Devereux (2004). In fact, 
however, Broadberry (1993) had already suggested the use of additional benchmarks 
to provide cross-checks in a study of comparative productivity in manufacturing, 
while Broadberry (1997a; 1997b; 1998) applied the method to full sectoral 
productivity comparisons over the period 1870-1990 for the United Kingdom with the 
United States and Germany, and found broad agreement between the benchmarks and 
time series evidence for those countries. Broadberry and Irwin (2006; 2007) find 
similar agreement between time series projections and benchmarks for the United 
Kingdom compared with the United States in the nineteenth century and the United 
Kingdom compared with Australia over the period 1861-1948. 
 
  Dealing with a less developed economy such as India presents greater data 
problems than with relatively rich countries such as the United States and Germany. 
Nevertheless, for the agricultural sector at least, it is possible to collect together a 
number of additional benchmark estimates of comparative India/UK labour 
productivity levels in Table 12. For 1935/36, it is possible to use the same methods as 
for the 1950/51 agricultural benchmark, to arrive at a comparative India/UK labour 
productivity level of 7.5, which is quite consistent with the time series projection of 
7.1. For the period 1970-1990, Prasada Rao (1993) provides benchmark estimates of   13
agricultural output per worker every 5 years for many countries, including India and 
the United Kingdom. These estimates suggest that the time series projections are 
broadly tracking the benchmarks.  
 
  For the economy as a whole, we can check the projection of GDP per capita 
from the 1950/51 benchmark in Table 10 against Maddison’s (2003) benchmark 
estimate for 1990. Our time series projection suggests Indian GDP per capita in 1990 
at 8.8 per cent of the UK level, which compares with Maddison’s benchmark estimate 
of 8.5 per cent.  
 
  For industry, as yet we lack comparable benchmark studies for other years. 
Timmer (1999) has conducted an India/US benchmark comparison for manufacturing 
using Indian price data for 1983/84 and US price data for 1987 projected back to 
1983. Making use of a US/UK benchmark for 1987, it is possible to derive an 
estimate of the India/UK comparative labour productivity level. Apart from the fact 
that this already involves a substantial element of time series projection to a year for 
which we do not have employment data, there are additional adjustments which make 
comparability with the Sivasubramonian (2000) data problematic. Timmer (1999) 
finally reports his results in the form of a benchmark for 1987, reporting Indian labour 
productivity in manufacturing at 16.4 per cent of the UK level for registered firms, but 
only 4.1 per cent for all firms. The former number is broadly consistent with our time 
series projections, while the latter seems difficult to square with the data on GDP per 
head. This suggests that Timmer is including more of the village economy in the 
industrial sector than Sivasubramonian (2000). 
   14
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper provides a sectoral analysis of comparative India/UK labour productivity 
performance over the period 1870-2000. In the late nineteenth century, overall labour 
productivity in India was around 15 per cent of the UK level, where it remained until 
the end of the 1920s. Between 1929 and 1950, India fell further behind and remained 
at around 10 per cent of the UK level until the 1970s, since when India has been 
catching-up. However, by the end of the twentieth century India remained further 
behind than in the late nineteenth century. This disappointing Indian productivity 
performance is largely due to the agricultural sector. This is the only sector where 
India has continued to fall further and further behind, with labour productivity at the 
end of the twentieth century around 1 per cent of the UK level. Although there have 
been fluctuations in comparative India/UK productivity in industry, there has been no 
trend, with India at around 15 per cent of the UK level in the late nineteenth and late 
twentieth centuries. Only in services has there been an upward trend in comparative 
India/UK labour productivity. The recent emergence of a dynamic service-led Indian 
economy thus has long historical roots. 
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TABLE 1: Indian time series for output and employment (1929=100) 
 
A. Output 
 Agriculture Industry Services GDP
1872/73 65.8 36.7 47.3 56.0
1882/83 71.0 38.9 46.8 59.1
1890/91 81.3 46.3 51.2 67.4
1900/01 82.9 56.2 53.4 70.3
1910/11 99.2 78.0 67.8 86.8
1920/21 85.0 61.9 78.9 80.1
1929/30 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1935/36 99.2 107.0 102.4 101.2
1946/47 101.3 119.4 110.4 106.5
1950/51 87.8 108.0 91.6 91.7
1960/61 119.7 196.4 135.6 134.9
1970/71 149.9 333.2 212.7 193.7
1980/81 175.4 493.4 322.1 262.9
1990/91 180.7 994.3 589.2 453.0




 Agriculture Industry Services Total
1872/73 83.4 99.4 82.3 84.6
1882/83 84.9 100.9 84.2 86.2
1890/91 91.3 108.8 90.5 92.7
1900/01 93.1 111.2 92.0 94.5
1910/11 99.7 114.1 96.2 100.5
1920/21 99.9 103.9 93.0 99.1
1929/30 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1935/36 101.7 108.4 107.6 103.2
1946/47 111.9 125.4 117.4 113.9
1950/51 112.5 130.0 127.5 116.3
1960/61 130.1 168.4 145.6 135.7
1970/71 161.5 203.0 170.9 166.7
1980/81 165.3 264.2 194.1 178.5
1990/91 208.0 316.5 278.7 228.1
1999/00 262.9 474.7 463.4 311.7
 
Sources: see Appendix 1. 
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TABLE 2: Indian labour productivity 
 
A. Time series for output per employee (1929=100) 
 Agriculture Industry Services GDP
1872/73 78.9 36.9 57.5 66.2
1882/83 83.6 38.6 55.6 68.6
1890/91 89.0 42.6 56.6 72.7
1900/01 89.0 50.5 58.0 74.4
1910/11 99.5 68.4 70.5 86.4
1920/21 85.1 59.6 84.8 80.8
1929/30 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1935/36 97.5 98.7 95.2 98.1
1946/47 90.5 95.2 94.0 93.5
1950/51 78.0 83.1 71.8 78.8
1960/61 92.0 116.6 93.1 99.4
1970/71 92.8 164.1 124.5 116.2
1980/81 106.1 186.8 165.9 147.3
1990/91 86.9 314.2 211.4 198.6
1999/00 119.2 361.7 243.2 241.0
 
 
B. Average annual growth rates (% per year) 
 Agriculture Industry Services GDP 
1872/73 to 1900/01  0.4 1.1 0.0 0.4 
1900-01 to 1946/47  0.0 1.4 1.0 0.5 
1950/51 to 1970/71  0.9 3.4 2.8 1.9 
1970-81 to 1999/00  0.9 2.7 2.3 2.5 
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 Agriculture Industry Services GDP
1871 121.8 34.7 41.3 44.0
1881 116.8 42.6 52.5 52.2
1891 124.3 51.1 64.4 62.5
1901 113.6 64.0 78.3 75.0
1911 118.5 72.9 93.5 87.1
1920 83.5 78.0 93.5 87.0
1929 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1935 103.4 112.5 107.1 109.2
1948 114.4 148.2 122.3 131.0
1950 125.8 165.7 124.6 140.7
1960 158.6 224.4 152.6 180.8
1970 201.1 296.0 195.6 235.0
1980 263.0 316.5 237.8 270.7
1990 327.8 374.0 317.5 349.5




 Agriculture Industry Services Total
1871 207.7 67.7 51.6 70.4
1881 190.4 73.4 59.5 75.5
1891 175.1 82.4 70.3 83.5
1901 161.1 93.1 83.7 93.6
1911 159.8 102.0 93.4 102.2
1920 115.9 109.5 92.5 101.8
1929 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1935 91.2 98.3 103.9 100.5
1948 106.5 111.6 121.4 115.8
1950 105.0 115.2 120.5 117.0
1960 89.9 124.9 130.4 124.9
1970 59.7 123.6 141.3 127.3
1980 48.8 108.2 167.0 132.1
1990 42.4 86.4 196.6 136.3
1999 35.0 71.4 215.1 138.0
 
Sources: See Appendix 1. 
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TABLE 4: UK labour productivity 
 
A. Time series for output per employee (1929=100) 
 Agriculture Industry Services GDP
1871 58.6 51.3 80.0 62.5
1881 61.3 58.0 88.2 69.1
1891 71.0 62.0 91.6 74.9
1901 70.5 68.7 93.5 80.1
1911 74.2 71.5 100.1 85.2
1920 72.0 71.2 101.1 85.5
1929 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1935 113.4 114.4 103.1 108.7
1948 107.4 132.8 100.7 113.1
1950 119.8 143.8 103.4 120.3
1960 176.4 179.7 117.0 144.8
1970 336.9 239.5 138.4 184.6
1980 538.9 292.5 142.4 204.9
1990 773.1 432.9 161.5 256.4
1999 952.6 577.7 186.6 300.7
 
 
B. Average annual growth rates (% per year) 
 Agriculture Industry Services GDP 
1871 to 1911  0.6 0.8 0.6 0.8 
1920 to 1950  1.7 2.3 0.1 1.1 
1950 to 1970  5.2 2.6 1.5 2.1 
1970 to 1999  3.6 3.0 1.0 1.7 
 
Sources: Derived from Table 3. 
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Wheat 16.12 15.1 14.2 
Rice 6.97 52.9  
Barley 10.37 3.5 13.2 
Tea 12.38 3.5  
Coffee 7.68 0.3  
Sugar 19.33 14.9 15.2 
Mutton 17.78 1.6 50.5 
Cotton 7.15 4.7  
Wool 12.59 0.2 6.6 
Silk 20.41 0.3  
Jute 9.46 2.5  
Hides 8.07 0.5 0.3 
Total agriculture  13.32 100.0 100.0 
 
Sources: Indian prices: Central Statistical Organisation (1953: Table 121); UK prices: 
Editor of “The Statist” (1951); Indian weights: derived from Sivasubramonian (2000: 
Table 3.23, Appendix Table 3(c)); UK weights: Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 














Chemicals & allied  20.98 8.8 7.2
Metals & engineering  11.66 20.6 46.9
Textiles & clothing  6.99 54.3 17.9
Food, drink & tobacco  15.43 11.0 10.7
Other industry  14.71 5.3 17.3
Total industry  11.43 100.0 100.0
 
Sources: Indian prices and weights: Ministry of Commerce and Industry (1954); UK 
prices and weights: Board of Trade (1956). 
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TABLE 7: Comparative India/UK GDP per employee by sector, 1950/51 
 
A. Compared at exchange rate 
 Agriculture Industry Services  GDP 
India (Rs)  421 833 997  556 
UK (£)  587 498 466  487 
Exchange rate (Rs per £)  13.36 13.36 13.36  13.36 
India/UK (UK=100)  5.4 12.5 16.0  8.5 
 
 
B. Compared at sectoral PPPs 
 Agriculture Industry Services  GDP 
India (Rs)  421 833 997  556 
UK (£)  587 498 466  487 
PPP (Rs per £)  13.32 11.43 12.26  12.26 
India/UK (UK=100)  5.4 14.6 17.5  9.3 
 
Sources: Nominal GDP: India: Sivasubramonian (2000: Table 6.9, Appendix Table 
8(a)); UK: Mitchell (1988: 824); Employment: India: Sivasubramonian (2000: Tables 
2.11, 9.32); UK: Feinstein (1972: Table 59); Market exchange rate: Central Statistical 






TABLE 8: Comparative India/UK labour productivity by sector (UK=100) 
 
 Agriculture Industry Services GDP
1871-73 11.2 18.2 18.1 15.0
1881-83 11.3 16.8 15.9 14.1
1890-91 10.4 17.3 15.6 13.8
1900-01 10.5 18.6 15.6 13.2
1910-11 11.1 24.2 17.7 14.4
1920-21 9.8 21.1 21.1 13.4
1929-30 8.3 25.3 25.2 14.2
1935-36 7.1 21.8 23.2 12.8
1946-48 7.0 18.1 23.5 11.7
1950-51 *5.4 *14.6 *17.5 *9.3
1960-61 4.3 16.4 20.0 9.7
1970-71 2.3 17.3 22.6 8.9
1980-81 1.6 16.1 29.3 10.2
1990-91 0.9 18.3 33.0 11.0
1999-00 1.0 15.8 32.8 11.4
 
Source: Derived from Tables 2, 4 and 7. 
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TABLE 9: Labour force by sector (%) 
 
A. India 
 Agriculture  Industry Services
1875 73.4  14.5 12.1
1910/11 75.5  10.3 14.2
1929/30 73.1  9.1 14.8
1950/51 73.6  10.2 16.2
1970/71 73.8  11.1 15.1
1999/00 64.2  13.9 21.9
 
B. United Kingdom 
 Agriculture  Industry Services
1871 22.2  42.4 35.4
1911 11.8  44.1 44.1
1929 7.5  44.2 48.3
1950 6.8  43.5 49.7
1970 3.5  42.9 53.6
2000 1.9  22.9 75.2
 
Sources: India: derived from Sivasubramonian (2000); UK: derived from Feinstein 





TABLE 10: Comparative India/UK per capita income and labour productivity 
(UK=100)  
 




1871-73 15.6  15.0
1881-83 15.1  14.1
1890-91 14.4  13.8
1900-01 13.6  13.2
1910-11 14.8  14.4
1920-21 13.1  13.4
1929-30 13.5  14.2
1935-36 11.9  12.8
1946-48 9.7  11.7
1950-51 *9.1  *9.3
1960-61 8.9  9.7
1970-71 8.4  8.9
1980-81 8.0  10.2
1990-91 8.8  11.0
1999-00 10.8  11.4
 
Sources: Population: India: Heston (1983: 394); Sivasubramonian (2000: Table 2.10, 
Appendix Table 8(c)); UK: Feinstein (1972: Table 55); Central Statistical Office 
(various years). GDP and PPPs from Tables 1, 3 and 7.   22
TABLE 11: Labour force share of population (%) 
 
 India  United  Kingdom 
1871/73 46.1  44.5 
1910/11 46.2  45.0 
1929/30 41.3  42.6 
1950/51 45.0  46.1 
1970/71 42.8  45.7 
1999/00 43.7  46.2 
 
Sources: Labour force: India: Heston (1983: 394); Sivasubramonian (2000: Tables 
2.10, 9.30-9.32); UK: Feinstein (1972: Tables 59, 60); O’Mahony (2002); Population: 




TABLE 12: Benchmarks and time series projections in agriculture 
 




1935/36 7.1  7.5
1950/51 *5.4  5.4
1970/71 2.3  2.3
1980/81 1.7  2.0
1990/91 0.9  1.8
 
Sources: Time series projection: Table 8; PPP benchmarks: 1935/36: using same 
method as Table 5, based on Indian data from Secretary of State for India (1939: 
Table 171) and UK data from Board of Trade (1939: Table 192); 1950/51: Table 5; 
1970/71, 1980/81 and 1990/91: Prasada Rao (1993: Table 5.9). 
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APPENDIX 1: SOURCES FOR TIME SERIES PROJECTIONS OF 
COMPARATIVE LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY BY SECTOR 
 
INDIA 
Output by sector 
1868/69 to 1900/01: Heston (1983: 397). Note that Heston provides data only for 
services plus small-scale industry. Small-scale industry is calculated for the 
pre-19000 period as the 1900-01 share (36%). The share remained at about 
this level until WWI, then dropped to around 30%, where it remained for the 
interwar period. The total of small-scale industry and services also grew only 
very slowly during this period, at 0.5% per annum.  
1900/01 to 1946/47: Sivasubramonium (2000: Table 6.11). 
1946/47 to 1999/2000: Sivasubramonium (2000: Table 8b). 
 
Employment by sector 
1868/69 to 1900/01: Heston (1983: 396). The 1900-01 employment data from 
Sivasubramonium (2000: Table 2.11) were used to determine the breakdown 
between agriculture, industry and services. The Heston (1983: 394, 396) data 
were used to establish the constancy of sectoral shares before 1900. 
1900/01 to 1946/47: Sivasubramonium (2000: Table 2.11). 
1946/47 to 1999/2000: Derived from Sivasubramonium (2000: Table 9.32). 
 
Territory 
Boundaries of British India before 1946/47, modern India thereafter. 
 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Output by sector 
1871-1965: Feinstein (1972: Table 8). Weights for component parts of service sector 
from Feinstein (1972: 208). 
1965-2000: UK National Statistics (various years), UK National Accounts. 
 
Employment by sector 
1871-1938: Feinstein (1972: Tables 59, 60). 
1948-1999: O'Mahony (2002), projected back from 1950 to 1948 using Feinstein 
(1972: Table 59). 
 
Territory 
Boundaries of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland before 1920, Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland after 1920. 
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